Philippa Foot

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Introduction

Philippa Foot (1920 – 2010) is one of the leading philosophers of the 20th century analytic philosophy. Her two collections of essays and her one monograph include important contributions to debates concerning the objectivity of morality, the meaning of moral terms, the logical status of moral judgments, the nature of practical rationality, the place of human action and reason in nature, the limitations of consequentialism, the rationality of justice and morality, the connection between virtue and happiness, the relation between reasons and desires, the character and the pervasiveness of moral dilemmas, the threat of immoralism, etc. But the contribution of her work extends past these interventions in discussions that were already underway. Foot's thought was part of what reoriented the focus of analytic philosophy from a partial view of morality as a system of rules concerning the relation between individuals and between individuals and society to a wider view of the human good as what it is to be good at being at work in being human. Her contribution to this shift in analytic philosophy was often overlooked (hence the scarce exegetic literature on her work) or misunderstood. When it was misunderstood her thought contributed to the rise of the virtue-ethics alternative to the utilitarian and deontological normative ethical theories. But when it was properly appreciated, it contributed to the emergence of neo-Aristotelianism in practical philosophy in general (life, action, rationality, normativity, etc.).

The substance of Foot's philosophy is Aristotelian: her exploration of the human good through the lenses of the virtues, her conception of the human virtues as forms of goodness which don't depart logically from forms of goodness in plant and animal life, and her account of practical rationality as the cognitive element of the virtues. The spirit in which she does philosophy is Wittgensteinian: her treatment of moral subjectivism by constantly bringing attention back to the grammar of moral concepts, as well as the construal of her positive view concerning the human good in terms of the nature of the representation of that good; especially in her later work. Given her wide-ranging contribution to philosophy, it is a shame that Philippa Foot is largely known for thought experiments such as the Trolley Problem.

Luckily, excellent recent systematic and exegetic philosophy on her work is promising to correct this unfortunate circumstance.

General Overviews

The reader can find a concise presentation of Foot's work in Hursthouse 2012. Hacker-Wright 2018 is a way more comprehensive entry in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Hacker-Wright 2013 provides the only book-length treatment of Foot's work as a whole. Foot 2003 gives an excellent account of the spirit of the work by the philosopher herself.

Hursthouse, Rosalind, "Philippa Ruth Foot 1920–2010." *Biographical Memoirs of Fellows of the British Academy*, XI (2012): 176–196.
> Short encyclopedic entry. Contains some information on her life and intellectual background but also a short overview of her work with an emphasis on her early views on the fact/value and is/ought gap, her work in applied ethics and her Natural Goodness. Useful for the beginner.

Hacker-Wright, John. *Philippa Foot's Moral Thought*. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013.
> Surprisingly enough, the only comprehensive monograph on Foot's work. Situates her work beautifully in contemporary analytic moral philosophy. Traces the lines of continuity and discontinuity that run through her corpus. Discusses objections to her fundamental claims and offers a convincing interpretation of the systematic nature of her thought. Ideal for anyone who is interested in the thought of Philippa Foot but also in 20th century analytic ethics.

"The Grammar of Goodness: An Interview with Philippa Foot." In *The Harvard Review of Philosophy*, vol. xi (2003): 32-44.
> In this interview Foot discusses the origin of her interest in moral philosophy, her Anscombean and Wittgensteinian influences, she traces the origin of her interest in the virtues in her aspiration to ground the objectivity of moral judgments, and provides insight into most of the strands of her argument in Natural Goodness. It is worth noting that she gives a secondary role to her work in medical ethics.

Hacker-Wright, John. "Philippa Foot". In *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2018 Edition). Edward N. Zalta (ed.), forthcoming URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/philippa-foot/>*.
> Very clear and thoughtful introduction to Foot's contribution to moral philosophy. Focusses largely on Foot's most important work, doing justice to the subtleties of her thought as opposed to giving a brief and unsatisfactory reading of most of her published work. Ideal for the student of moral philosophy but also anyone with an interest in Foot's ethical naturalism.

Anthologies

There are two series of collected papers by Foot (Foot 2002a and Foot 2002b), both published in her lifetime. Both were edited by Foot herself and contain introductions that are helpful for any reader who is interested in the progression of her work. They contain almost all of Foot's published papers. Both contain Foot's work against moral subjectivism, consequentialism and immoralism and her defence of a virtue way of thinking about ethics and its objectivity and rationality.

Foot, Philippa. *Virtues and Vices*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002a.

Originally published in 1978. Foot's earliest collection of essays. Contains papers from her early period, most notably of which her Moral Beliefs and papers from the middle period, most notably of which *Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives*. Also contains work on applied ethics, Nietzsche and modern moral philosophy.

Foot, Philippa. *Moral Dilemmas and Other Topics in Moral Philosophy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002b.

Foot's second collection of essays. Contains essays from her middle and late period. Most notably her papers *Utilitarianism and the Virtues* and *Rationality and Virtue*. Some of this work foreshadows the naturalism of her monograph *Natural Goodness*.

Monograph

Foot 2001 contains the only book-length work by Foot. It is the culmination of her work in moral philosophy and one of the most important treatments of ethical naturalism today.

Foot, Philippa. *Natural Goodness*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.

Foot's only monograph. Contains chapters on her attack on moral non-cognitivism, on the grammar of the representation of life, on ethical naturalism, the connection between virtue and happiness and immoralism.

Edited Volumes

In her life-time Foot edited one collection of essays (Foot 1967) which contains papers in analytic metaethics regarding the nature of moral judgments and in normative ethics regarding the status of utilitarianism.

Philippa Foot. *Theories of Ethics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967.

Contains an introduction by Foot. And very well known articles by Stevenson, Moore, Frankena, Geach, Searle, Hare and Rawls among other people.

Collections

Hursthouse, Lawrence and Quinn 1995 is a collection of essays in honor of Foot (a Festschrift) edited by Rosalind Hursthouse, Gavin Lawrence, and Warren Quinn. It contains work by some of the most notable philosophers of the second half of the 20th century and it spans most of the areas covered by Foot's thought. Hacker-Wright 2018 is a new collection of essays focusing mostly on the ethical naturalism of Foot's later period. The quality and depth of this collection is bound to regenerate the already mounting interest in Foot's moral thought.

Hursthouse, Rosalind, Lawrence, Gavin and Quinn, Warren, eds. *Virtues and Reasons: Philippa Foot and Moral Theory: Essays in Honour of Philippa Foot*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.

Brilliant collection of essays on Foot's work, at least half of which are groundbreaking contributions to the field rather than merely exegetical or critical essays on Foot. See for instance Anscombe's Practical Inference, McDowell's Two Sorts of Naturalism, Thompson's The Representation of Life, Quinn's Putting Rationality in its Place, Lawrence's The Rationality of Morality, etc.

Hacker-Wright, John. *Philippa Foot on Goodness and Virtue*. London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2018.

Another brilliant collection of essays which do not restrict themselves to exegesis or critique but which, starting from Foot's thought in Natural Goodness, cover new philosophical ground. The essays bring forward the Wittgensteinian and the Aristotelian theme in Foot's work and draw fruitful connections with the thought of Acquinas but also work in contemporary virtue ethics. They also respond constructively to notorious criticisms that Foot's work has incurred.

Historical Background

The historical background of Foot's philosophy can be broken down into two periods. See *Ancient, Medieval and Modern Philosophy* and *20th Century Philosophy*.

Ancient, Medieval and Modern Philosophy

Foot's systematic work in ethics focusses on issues in 20th century analytic ethics in a way that is historically informed and informing. Foot is influenced by the Aristotelian conceptual connection between the idea of the good human being and the good for the human being, as well as the Aristotelian account of that good in terms of excellences of passion, thought and action (Aristotle 1984). Even though she is tempted by a Humean conception of rationality and motivation in the middle part of her work, she takes the Humean conception of the separation of the ought from is (See Hume 1978) to be the main foe in moral philosophy throughout her career. Part of what helps her recover a sense of the objectivity of morality without falling into the trap of moral rationalism is, she claims herself, Aquinas' detailed and rich account of the virtues (Aquinas 1265-1273).

Aristotle. "*Nicomachean Ethics*". In *The Complete Works of Aristotle*. By Aristotle. Translated and edited by Jonathan Barnes. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984.
> The most important treatment of the human good in antiquity. This treatment in terms of the excellences (virtues) of the human soul lies at the core of Foot's re-thinking of the analytic moral tradition of her time.

Aquinas, Thomas. *Summa Theologiae* (c. 1265–1273). *Corpus Thomisticum*.
> Contains careful and systematic account of the virtues which is heavily influenced by Aristotle. As Foot herself proclaims, Aquinas' account of the virtues was a huge influence on how she came to conceive of the objectivity of morality.

Hume, David. *A Treatise of Human Nature*. Edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge. Revised by P. H. Nidditch. Oxford: Clarendon, 1978.
> Contains the heart of the fundamental dogmas of 20th century moral subjectivism: the assumption that it is impossible to derive an ought from an is. An assumption that Foot fought against in all her writings. Originally published in 1739.

20th Century Philosophy

20th century analytic moral philosophy starts out as an attempt to recover moral philosophy from the naturalism of 19th century ethical thought. Thus, Moore's inaugural treatise in meta-ethics (Moore 2004) introduces the definition of good as the topic that moral philosophy should rightly take after the naturalistic fallacy has been cleared out of the way. Frankena 1958 and Prior 1949 contain interesting critiques of Moore's construction of the fallacy, but the fallacy retains its attraction on the philosophical imagination for years to come. Ayer 1952 accepts the gist of Moore's criticism of naturalism but argues against Moore that normative moral terms are not descriptive and therefore lack meaning altogether. Stevenson (Stevenson

1944 and 1963) argues that moral terms have meaning, provided we distinguish between two sorts of meaning: descriptive and normative. Hare (Hare 1952 and 1963) also distinguishes between the descriptive and evaluative dimension of meaning but argues that on the evaluative dimension, meaning is not emotive but prescriptive; tied with choice as opposed to states of affairs that need to be described. In arguing against the moral subjectivism of her time Foot argues against these versions of anti-naturalism. It is impossible to understand some of the claims in her early work (for instance, the break between moral judgment and choice in Foot 1961, cited under **Early Period: Against Emotivism**) without knowing that it is the thought of these philosophers she is battling with. And it is impossible to appreciate the depth of her preoccupation with the objectivity and the rationality of morality unless one has in mind that Foot is fighting against analytic meta-ethical subjectivism throughout her career. Last, but not least, her critique of moral subjectivism can be seen as an elucidation of the grammar of moral terms, in the sense of grammar handed down to her from Wittgenstein (Wittgenstein 1953).

Moore, George Edward. *Principia Ethica*. Dover Publications, 2004.
> Originally published in 1903. The inaugural treatise of meta-ethics. Takes the subject-matter of ethics to be the predicate in judgments of the form "X is good". Argues that these judgments are synthetic (*open question argument*) so that it is a fallacy to take any naturalistic description (what serves as the subject) as the definition of good (*naturalistic fallacy*). He concludes the indefinability of the good and its knowability in intuition.

Frankena, William K. "The Naturalistic Fallacy." Philosophy 33 (1958):158 – 162.
> A sustained and well argued for criticism of Moore's naturalistic fallacy. Argues that it is not really a fallacy but an insufficiently analyzed problem which threatens all attempts to advance metaethical theses on the basis of definitions of *the good*.

Prior, A. N. *Logic and the Basis of Ethics*. Oxford: Clarendon, 1949.
> An analysis of the naturalistic fallacy which is historically informed and very sharp.

Ayer, A. J.. *Language, Truth and Logic*. Dover Publications, 1952.
> Classical text. Introduces logical-positivism in British philosophy. Defends an empiricist-verificationist theory of meaning and truth, on which metaphysical disputes are nonsensical and normative ethical concepts are pseudo-concepts. Uses Moorean arguments to argue against naturalism but suggests, *contra* Moore, that normative ethical judgments rather than describing states of affairs express emotions and that they therefore lack meaning.

Stevenson, Charles. *Ethics and Language*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944.
> Seminal book. Develops an emotivist theory of ethics. Distinguishes between descriptive and emotive meaning and argues that the (ethical) predicate in judgments of the form "X is good" may add meaning to the subject provided we understand this meaning as emotive and not descriptive. He, thus, avoids Ayer's verificationist treatment of the emotivist function of language and Moore's intuitionist way out of the failure of naturalist definitions of the good.

Stevenson, Charles. *Facts and Values: Studies in Ethical Analysis*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963.
> Collection of articles. Restates the main elements of his emotivist theory of ethics in his Stevenson 1944 in a language intended for a wider audience (although three essays predate his seminal work) while defending the view against charges of

relativism, non-cognitivism, etc. Contains a helpful chapter on Moore's critique of naturalism and a final essay with corrections on the essays of the volume.

Hare, R. M. *The Language of Morals*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952.
Accepts Moore's open question argument against naturalism and follows Ayer and Stevenson in developing a theory of moral language which distinguishes between its descriptive and evaluative function. Unlike Ayer he thinks that this evaluative function is a function of *meaning* and unlike Stevenson he argues that this meaning is not emotive but *prescriptive*; that is, connected with choice and action and mediated by the application of general principles of commendation.

Hare, R. M. *Freedom and Reason*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963.
Contains an account of moral judgments as at once prescriptive and universalizable; thus trying to bridge a supposed gap between rationality and freedom and steer a middle ground between subjectivism and naturalism.

Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1953 [2009]. *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, P.M.S. Hacker, and Joachim Schulte, 4th edition, London: Wiley-Blackwell.
Shifts attention from consideration of the philosophical problems as timeless metaphysical and epistemological questions to the task of elucidating the possibilities of meaningful use (the grammar) of our concepts. Foot's criticism of moral subjectivism and emotivism throughout her career can be seen as a Wittgensteinian critique of the epistemological cum metaphysical projects in ethics.

Ethical Naturalism

Early Period: Against emotivism

In the early period of her work Foot systematically challenges the meta-ethical orthodoxy of her time which posits anti-naturalism at the foundation of analytic ethics. Following the spirit of analytic ethics Foot 1958a,1958b and 1961 diagnoses the situation as one in which the anti-naturalists have failed to give a sound account of the meaning of evaluative terms, and in particular one in which they have focused on the meaning of thin evaluative concepts (for the naming of this distinction which was first introduced by Foot and Anscombe (Anscombe 1958 and 1981) see Williams 1985). Focusing on thick evaluative concepts allows Foot to provide an alternative account of meaning, on which concepts, such as courage, bear an internal relation to their objects. On this picture, it is in virtue of being the concept that it is that a concept X (say *rudeness*) applies to one set of circumstances Y (say causing offence) and not another. Which is to say that the criteria of applicability of this concept are not external but internal to it. This account allows Foot to argue against the supposition of a gap between descriptive and evaluative judgments or dimensions of meaning and to thus rehabilitate the hitherto dethroned objectivity of morality. In the course of doing so she defends a version of moral rationalism, on which moral considerations are reasons for action independently of how one is disposed towards them, which she will abandon during the middle period of her career and return to a nuanced version of in the later period of her work. Her critique of emotivism is to a large extent reminiscent of Wittgenstein's critique of the private language argument (Wittgenstein 1953 under *20th Century Philosophy*), but also bears close affinity to Anscombe's hostility to the is ought gap, her injunction to abandon the legalistic vocabulary of thin moral concepts (Anscombe 1958 and 1957) and Geach's conception of good as an adjective always used attributively (Geach 1956).

Foot, Philippa. "Moral Arguments." *Mind*, 67 (1958a): 502-513.
> One of the very first papers against the anti-naturalist current of early analytic ethics. Attempts to undermine the fact value gap by arguing against the anti-naturalist thesis that evaluative conclusions do not follow from descriptive premises. The argument relies on a shift of focus from thin moral concepts (*good, right*) to thick moral concepts (*rude, courageous*). Reprinted in Foot 2002a (cited under *Anthologies*).

Williams, Bernard. *Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy*. London: Fontana, 1985.
> Establishes the terms "thick" and "thin" moral concepts although the distinction was there in the prior work of Foot (see Foot 1985a) and Anscombe (see Anscombe 1958).

Anscombe, G.E.M. "Modern Moral Philosophy." *Philosophy*, 33 (1958): 1–19.
> Celebrated article in 20th century moral philosophy. Encourages the abandonment of the legalistic vocabulary of *ought* and the shift of focus towards thicker moral concepts that have to do with facts about human flourishing and aspects of this flourishing (virtues). Reprinted in G.E.M Anscombe, *The Collected Philosophical Papers of G. E. M. Anscombe*, Volume 3, (Minneapolis MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1981.) 26-42.

Anscombe, G.E.M. "On brute facts." *Analysis* 18 (1957): 69 – 72.
> Short but important article. Argues that we may take the descriptive/evaluative distinction to bear in on the individuation of actions as such and shows that the most that can apply there is a naïve conception of factuality (bruteness). This shows that the need for a gap between description and evaluation was no real need at all. Reprinted in *Collected Papers* vol. 3. Oxford: Blackwell, 1981: 22-25.

Geach, Peter. "Good and Evil." *Analysis*, 17 (1956): 33–42.
> Brilliant short article. Distinguishes between attributive and predicative uses of adjectives and argues that the adjectives *good* and *bad* are attributive, so that *contra* the emotivists and the intuitionists of his time, to know what a good x is one must know what x is. Argues that we have reason to act morally because we are invested in acting and moral action is good action *as such*.

Foot, Philippa. "Moral Beliefs." *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 59 (1958b):83 - 104.
> Very important article. Wavers between a self-interest and an Aristotelian conception of rationality. Argues that moral terms are internally related to their object and that varieties of moral goodness (virtues) are varieties of human goodness; so that everyone has a reason to be moral because it is in everyone's interest to do what is good for humans. Reprinted in Foot 2002a (cited under *Anthologies*).

Foot, Philippa. "Goodness and Choice." *Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume* 35 (1) (1961):45-80.
> Argues against Hare's idea that the meaning of good is defined as the object of choice, on a conception of choice which floats free from the nature of what is chosen. Argues that the criteria of goodness lie in facts about the nature of the object to which it is attributed. Makes this case for living organisms also. Reprinted in Foot 2002a (cited under *Anthologies*).

Middle Period: Against moral rationalism

During the middle period of her philosophy Foot 1970, 1972a and 1972b continues her attack against the anti-cognitivism of analytic ethics whilst abandoning the moral rationalism of her early period in favor of a Humean conception of rationality. The reasons for this shift seem to have something to do both with the thought explicated by McDowell 1978 concerning the dubious character of the charge of irrationality against those who don't see the point of morality and with a problem Foot faced already in her early period concerning the well-founded belief of hers that virtue is beneficial to its possessor: If virtue is beneficial to its possessor, then how come justice (which is concerned with the benefit of the others) may be considered a virtue? The Humeanism of this phase of her work is forcefully criticized by a lot, most notably by Philips 1977, Smith 1994, Landau 2003, Lawrence 1995 and McDowell 1978. She replies to Philips in Foot 2002. Foot changes her view in the final period of her career.

Philippa Foot, "Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives." *The Philosophical Review* 81, no. 3 (1972a): 305–316.
> Seminal article, which she later repudiates. Argues that moral judgments provide reasons for action if one has the right ends. Rejects the moral rationalism of her early period and argues that the moral ought is like the ought of etiquette. It applies even when one sees no reason to follow it, but it does not automatically give one reason to follow it. Reprinted in Foot 2002a (cited under *Anthologies*).

Foot, Philippa. "Reasons for Action and Desire." *Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume* 46.1 (1972b):189 - 210.
> Provides another formulation of her rejection of the moral rationalism of her early period. Argues that reasons for action are conditional on the agent's interests and desires, which should be conceived of as independent sources of reasons. Treats the view that moral judgments are automatically reason giving as part of a magical thinking. Reprinted in Foot 2002a (cited under *Anthologies*).

Foot, Philippa. "Morality and Art." *Proceedings of the British Academy* 56 (1970): 131-144.
> The paper is worth reading in this connection because it makes explicit an assumption that underlies the Humeanism of her thought during this period. The assumption is that a man who does not care for morality does not have reason to be moral, because in this case the virtues produce benefit for others and not for oneself. Reprinted in Foot 2002b (cited under *Anthologies*).

Philips, 'In Search of the Moral "Must".' *Philosophical Quarterly* 27 (1977): 140–57.
> Interesting article criticizing Foot's middle views. Agrees on the pointlessness of levelling a charge of irrationality against those who do not see the point of morality, but rejects Foot's conception of moral care as having a distinctive group of interests on a par with other interests. Suggests that moral considerations are overriding because they concern the manner of all purposive behavior as opposed to one purpose among others.

Foot, Philippa. "Are Moral Considerations Overriding?" In *Virtues and Vices: And Other Essays in Moral Philosophy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978.
> A reply to Philips 1977. Argues that moral considerations are unconditional in the sense that their rational influence may not be overridden by the influence of other reasons for those who see their appeal clearly. Reprinted in Foot 2002b (cited under *Anthologies*)

McDowell, John. 1978. "Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?" *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 52(Supplement): 13–29. Reprinted in McDowell, J. 1998. *Mind, Value, and Reality*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. pp 95–111.

>An Aristotelian critique of Foot. Agrees with her that moral rationalism is unsustainable, but argues that moral considerations are both overriding and independent of one's desires. To see that one has reason to act morally it is sufficient to conceive of one's circumstances under the proper light. No separate conative element needs to be added to this conception. We may reject moral rationalism without espousing Humeanism about reasons like Foot.

Lawrence, Gavin. "The Rationality of Morality." In Hursthouse, R., Lawrence, G. and Quinn, W., eds. *Virtues and Reasons: Philippa Foot and Moral Theory: Essays in Honour of Philippa Foot*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.

>An extraordinarily rich and subtle account of Foot's early and middle period conception of practical rationality and a critique of this conception from the perspective of a classical account of reasons, on which what makes something into a reason for an agent is not its connection with her desires but with the good which can be realized in action.

Smith, Michael. *The Moral Problem*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1994.

>Important work in meta-ethics. Defends a neo-Humean account of motivation and a version of moral rationalism. Argues against Foot's middle view that moral requirements are categorical imperatives in the sense that they would give reasons for acting to anyone who was rational.

Shafer-Landau, Russ. *Moral Realism; A Defence*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003

>One of the most important contemporary defenses of moral realism. Argues against Foot that the analogy between morality and etiquette breaks down because the demands of morality are not contingent in origin.

Late Period: neo-Aristotelian Naturalism

During the final period of Foot's work, Foot distances herself from the Humeanism of her middle period and attempts to give a more systematic account of the objectivity and rationality of morality in terms of a neo-Aristotelianism naturalism. In this phase of her work, she argues against newer versions of moral subjectivism (see *Moral Dilemmas*), espouses and develops a new conception of practical rationality (see *Practical Rationality*), and a Thompsonian account of natural normativity (see *Natural Normativity*).

Moral Dilemmas

Foot's thought in her later period is animated by the same concern that animates her thought throughout her life. A dedication to the cause of combatting forms of meta-ethical non-cognitivism in the analytic orthodoxy of her time. Thus, the final phase of her career begins with an attack on Williams' version of non-cognitivism. Williams 1973 and 1966 argues that the possibility of the resolution of moral conflict with a remainder shows a discrepancy between moral conflict and cognitive conflict, from which he concludes that moral judgments are conative and not cognitive attitudes. Foot 1983 and 1995 accepts the premise concerning the possibility of conflict of this sort but rejects Williams' conclusion. In this argument, she gives careful consideration to the notion of the incommensurability of moral principles but

rejects the view that moral principles may conflict. That is, she rejects the view that moral reality may be such that moral wrongness may be inevitable.

Williams, Bernard. "Ethical Consistency." In *Problems of the Self.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973.
> Argues for moral non-cognitivism based on facts about moral conflict. In particular, he argues that moral conflict resembles conflict in desire and not belief in that the resolution of moral conflict may leave a remainder. He takes this to show that moral judgments do not purport to give us knowledge of an independent reality.

Williams, Bernard. "Consistency and realism." *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* (Supplementary Volume) 40 (1966): 1-22.
> Argues that inconsistency in the case of moral principles (imperatives) is unlike inconsistency in the case of assertions in that the former can be tolerated but the latter cannot. He takes this to show that assertions reflect an independent reality but moral principles do not. Reprinted in *Problems of the Self.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp 187-206.

Foot, Philippa. "Moral Realism and Moral Dilemmas." *Journal of Philosophy* 80.7 (1983):379-398.
> Argues that the possibility of irresolvable moral conflict without remainder does not carry anti-cognitivist implications for ethical judgements if we take into account the incommensurability of moral principles. Notes a serious problem that the notion of conflict between incommensurable principles poses for non Nietzschean accounts of morality. Reprinted in Foot 2002b (cited under *Anthologies*).

Foot, Philippa. "Moral Dilemmas Revisited." In Sinnott-Amstrong, W., Raffman, D., and Asher, N., eds., *Modality, Morality and Belief.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.
> Rehearses some of the old arguments of Foot 1983. Clarifies her conception of how we should disassociate moral loss from inevitable wrongness and explicates what the moral landscape would look like if inevitable wrongness in case of moral dilemmas were an intelligible possibility. Reprinted in Foot 2002b (cited under *Anthologies*).

Practical Rationality

In the later phase of her work Foot abandons the Humeanism of her middle period and returns to a version of moral rationalism whose edges are softened by Aristotelian naturalism. Continuing her attack on contemporary forms of non-cognitivism she argues against Gibbard's subjectivist account of ethical judgments (Gibbard 1990) and Mackie's moral scepticism (Mackie 1977). Her diagnosis of the mistake of moral subjectivism as the supposition of a gap between moral judgment and ground allows her to build an alternative conception of practical rationality. Thus, Foot 1994 argues that moral virtues are, like instrumental or self-regarding dispositions, forms of practical rationality; all of them grounded on facts about the flourishing of the species. Foot 2000 argues that practical rationality is not prior to but is grounded in facts of human goodness which are themselves grounded in facts about human nature. Foot 2001 argues that the Humean account of practical rationality (to which she too fell victim in her middle period) fails to appreciate that the nature of practical rationality is determined by facts about human goodness in general and not by particular facts of human goodness (say self-regarding goodness). This conception of practical rationality is to a large extent owed to the work of her colleague Warren Quinn (see Quinn 1993a and 1993b), who argues that the Humean accounts of practical rationality fail to connect practical rationality which an intelligible notion of the human good and proposes that we shift the order

of understanding of the relation between practical rationality and the human good. Foot's Aristotelian account has affinities to but may not be confused with McDowell's and Wiggin's Aristotelian accounts of practical rationality. McDowell 1979 and Wiggins 1975/6 both attempt to develop an Aristotelian account of practical rationality without grounding it in general facts about human nature and the human good.

Gibbard, Alan. *Wise Choices, Apt Feelings*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990.
> Lays out a variant of a non-cognitivist conception of morality and rationality. On this account, to call something rational is to express one's acceptance of the norms which permit it, where what it is to accept norms is analyzed in terms of evolutionary psychology.

Mackie, J. L. *Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong*. Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 1977.
> One of the most influential sceptical accounts of morality of the second half of the 20th century. Argues, among other things, that moral facts do not exist based on considerations of metaphysical queerness and cultural relativism.

Foot, Philippa. "Does Moral Subjectivism Rest on a Mistake?" In *Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement* 46 (2000):107-123.
> Accepts the subjectivist requirement to conceive of moral judgments as practical but argues that this cannot be done in terms of the fact-value gap. Explains the practicality of moral judgments in terms of an alternative conception of practical rationality, on which rationality is not prior to but is grounded in facts of human goodness. Reprinted in Foot 2002b (cited under *Anthologies*).

Foot, Philippa. "Rationality and Virtue." In *Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook* 2 (1994):205-216
> Construes virtue as a sensitivity to reasons for acting and suggests that reasons for acting are grounded in facts about the non-defective life of the species. Argues that just actions no less than instrumental or self-regarding actions are practically rational in this sense, thus offering a unifying account of practical rationality. Reprinted in Foot 2002b (cited under *Anthologies*).

Quinn, Warren. "Putting Rationality in its Place." In *Morality and Action*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993a.
> Very influential article in the cognitivist tradition and one that Foot herself often cites. Argues that subjectivist non-cognitivist (Humean) accounts of practical rationality cannot explain how moral judgments rationalize actions in accordance with them. Defends a cognitivist view on which the human good is the source of practical rationality and not the other way around.

Quinn, Warren. "Rationality and the Human Good." In *Morality and Action*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993b.
> Another of Quinn's articles which both influenced and were influenced by Foot's later thought on practical rationality and the human good. Against the Humean conception of practical rationality as an excellence indifferent to morality he argues that this excellence could not aim at or be part of the human good. Proposes that notions of practical rationality are derivative from as opposed to prior to notions of the human good.

Foot, Philippa. Natural Goodness. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.
> Argues against the moral sceptic (who asks what reason she has to follow morality) that practical rationality is intrinsically linked to moral goodness, because contrary to

Humean accounts of rationality, it is facts about human goodness in general which determine the nature of practical rationality and not facts about merely an aspect of human goodness (say facts about prudential goodness).

Foot, Philippa. "Rationality and Goodness." *Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement* 54 (2004):1-13.
> Short paper on practical rationality which rehearses the main features of her account in Foot 2001, helpful because it clarifies what she takes to be her philosophical debt to Warren Quinn's view.

McDowell, John. "Virtue and Reason." *Monist* 62 (1979): 331–350.
> Helpfully contrasted with Foot's view. According to McDowell, virtues are forms of practical knowledge. Such knowledge is based on being sensitive to contextually salient reasons in particular circumstances. This sensitivity requires having the right kinds of concerns, which explains how practical reason can be both recognitional and motivational. Reprinted in McDowell's *Mind, Value, and Reality* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998).

Wiggins, David. "Deliberation and Practical Reason." *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 76 (1975–1976): 29–51.
> Wiggins investigates Aristotle's seemingly different accounts of practical reasoning in Book 3 (means-end reasoning) and in Books 6 and 7 ("rule-case" reasoning) of *Nicomachean Ethics*. In his view, these accounts do not conflict, as they both characterize deliberation about what the constituents of happiness are. Reprinted in Wiggins's *Needs, Values, Truth: Essays in the Philosophy of Value*, 3d ed. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1998).

Natural normativity

Connected with her account of practical rationality (as posterior to and not prior to facts about human goodness) is Foot's attempt to explain how norms may be grounded in facts about human nature; i.e. how natural norms are possible. This part of Foot's thought is influenced by Michael Thompson's account of natural normativity. Thompson 2008 and 2004 provides an account of natural norms which is grounded on a conception of the description of life processes as a logically distinctive form of representation. Thompson's account is inspired by Anscombe 1958 and 1969. Foot 2001 builds on this Thompsonian account of natural normativity and puts a characteristic emphasis on the similarity between the normativity of facts about plant life and the normativity of facts about human life. Foot's natural normativism has attracted a lot of criticism which largely misses the mark. Thompson 2003, Lott 2012 and Hacker-Wright 2009 explain in concise and helpful ways how these criticisms miss the mark. Brewer 2009 contains a more interesting and fruitful criticism of the Thompsonian project and McDowell 1995 contains a critique of Foot's earlier naturalism which may prove threatening to her later account as well. (For recent critical studies on Foot's naturalism that are bound to regenerate interest in Foot's naturalism see Hacker-Wright 2018 (cited under *General Overviews*).)

Anscombe, G.E.M. "Modern Moral Philosophy." *Philosophy*, 33 (1958): 1–19.
> Diagnoses the anti-naturalist inclination of moral philosophers (to take the moral value of x to transcend any factual descriptions of x) as a remain of a divine law account of value and envisions a moral philosophy with the conceptual resources of virtue as opposed to moral obligation. Reprinted in G.E.M Anscombe, *The Collected*

Philosophical Papers of G. E. M. Anscombe, Volume 3, (Minneapolis MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1981) 26-42.

Anscombe, G.E.M. "On Promising and its Justice and Whether It Needs be Respected in Forno Interno." *Critica* 3.7/8 (1969): 61-83.
Difficult but very rewarding article. Argues against the view that actions that are physical happenings are what they are independently of how they are being thought, by focussing on actions of binding oneself. Explains the bindingness of these actions by distinguishing between three levels of necessity and giving an Aristotelian account of this necessity in terms of contribution to the good.

Thompson, Michael. *Life and Action: Elementary Structures of Practice and Practical Thought*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008.
Following Anscombe's admonition, in the most original philosophical work in years Thompson lays out the metaphysical groundwork of an Aristotelian conception of ethics. The focus of this work is the logical peculiarity of the representation of life. This, he argues, is constitutive of a natural-historical normativity, in terms of which we should understand our capacity for practical reason, the perfect exercise of which is the life of virtue.

Foot, Philippa. *Natural Goodness*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.
Espouses the Thompsonian conception of natural normativity in the case of the life of plants and animals and argues that the same conceptual structure is there in the case of the life of humans. This allows her to ground the normativity of moral judgements in natural facts about human life.

McDowell, John. "Two Kinds of Naturalism." In *Virtues and Reasons: Philippa Foot and Moral Theory*. Edited by Rosalind Hursthouse, Gavin Lawrence, and Warren Quinn, 149–179. Oxford: Clarendon, 1995.
Explicitly targets the neo-Humean account of Foot's middle period but contains a line of argument against any account which seeks to ground the normativity of virtue (2nd nature in his terms) in independently understood facts of human nature (1st nature in his own terms) and so indirectly provides an argument against a certain interpretation Foot's later view as well.

Thompson, Michael. "Apprehending Human Form." *Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement* 54 (2004): 47-74.
To be read together with Thompson 2008. Explains and defends the view that the concept of life form in general and human form of life in particular are *a priori* and not empirical concepts and thus attempts to fend off the charge of empiricism and biologism that naturalists about normativity and ethical naturalists in particular face.

Thompson Michael. "Three Degrees of Natural Goodness." *Iride*, 38 (2003): 191-197.
Very helpful, short article for the understanding of Foot's naturalism. Contains a very helpful exposition of Foot's view and a defence against McDowell 1995 in terms of a distinction in Foot's theory between three levels of naturalism: logical, local and substantive naturalism.

Brewer, Talbot. "The Foundations of Neo-Aristotelianism: Critical Notice of Michael Thompson, Life and Action." *Philosophical Books* 50.4(2009):197-212.
Contains the most intelligent presentation and friendly criticism of the Thompsonian account of natural normativity up to date. Finds in Foot the beginning of a problem

with her and Thompson's naturalism: that it is difficult without circularity to distinguish between natural-historical judgments about the life of the species which ground normative judgments about the individual and natural-historical judgments which don't.

Lott, Mikah. "Moral Virtue as Knowledge of Human Form." *Social Theory and Practice* 38.3(2012):407-431.
> Contains a defense of Foot's moral naturalism against the objection that it cannot sustain its force in the face of finds in the social and biological sciences concerning human nature. In order to carry out this defense Lott develops an interesting conception of virtue as knowledge of the human form.

Hacker-Wright, Joh. "What is natural about Foot's Ethical Naturalism?" *Ratio* 22.3 (2009):308-321.
> Presents a fair assessment of recent critiques of Foot's version of naturalism, which complain either of a naïve conception of facts of biology or of a dangerous grounding of practical rationality on independent facts of nature. The article in both cases shows that the criticism misses the distinctive logical status of Foot's preoccupation with facts of nature and human nature respectively.

The Virtues

Following Anscombe's injunction in Anscombe 1958 Foot restores the centrality of thick moral concepts in moral discourse by returning to an understanding of the human good in terms of the virtues. This return, unlike what Hursthouse 1999 for instance seems to think, is not Foot's account of the criterion of morally right action to be thought of as an alternative along the side of utilitarian and deontological criteria but her attempt to distance herself from the need to have a criterial conception of morality altogether. Central to Foot's account of the virtues is the conception of them as beneficial to its possessor (Foot 1983a). Foot explains the practicality of moral judgments in terms of the contribution of the virtues to the human good. Foot 1989 ties the concept of the virtues to the concept of good action and is explicit about the sense in which this good is wider than the moral good. Foot 1983b ties the concept of good action afforded to us by consideration on the virtues with facts of human life to be understood as bearing no difference in logical form than facts about animal and plant life. In Foot 1985 shows how a return to the virtues may help us explain and dismantle the charm of consequentialism. Foot 2001 explores the conceptual connection between virtues and happiness and suggests that even though the virtues are necessary for happiness they are not sufficient for it. Foot 2004 distances herself from so-called virtue-ethics, the most profound of which is Hursthouse 1999. Hacker-Wright 2010 contains an excellent account of the difference between Foot's return to the virtues and the so-called virtue-ethics and Lawrence 2018 contains a brilliant discussion of the account of the connection between virtue and happiness in Foot 2001.

Anscombe, G.E.M. "Modern Moral Philosophy." *Philosophy*, 33 (1958): 1–19.
> Seminar work in moral philosophy; enjoins the return to an Aristotelian discussion of virtue as a way out of (and not as an alternative to) the dogmas of utilitarian and deontological ethical theories. Reprinted in G.E.M Anscombe, *The Collected Philosophical Papers of G. E. M. Anscombe*, Volume 3, (Minneapolis MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1981.) 26-42.

Foot, Philippa. "Virtues and Vices." *Noûs* 17 (1) (1983):117-121.

Gives a relatively detailed account of her conception of virtue. On this conception, virtue is beneficial to its possessor and to others, it belongs to the will in the wide sense of the term and it functions as a corrective on defects of human nature. Raises the Platonic problem of justice as beneficial to its possessor. Reprinted in Foot 2002a (cited under *Anthologies*).

Foot, Philippa. "Von Wright on Virtue." In *The Philosophy of Georg Henrik von Wright*. Edited by Schilpp, P.A., and Hahn, E. Open Court Publishing Company, 1989.
Defends features of the classical conception of virtue (Aristotle's and Aquinas') against von Wright's account of virtue. Denies that virtues may be identified with the mere mastery of certain passions or with self-control in general. Argues that there is a closer connection between virtuous dispositions and good actions, on a conception of goodness which extends beyond moral goodness. Reprinted in Foot 2002b (cited under *Anthologies*).

Foot, Philippa. "Utilitarianism and the Virtues." *Mind* 94 (374 (1985)):196-209.
Very important paper for the critique of consequentialism but also helpful for understanding what Foots takes to be a distortion of the distinctive place of the notion of maximum welfare and goodness of a state of affairs in virtue ethics. Reprinted in Foot 2002b (cited under *Anthologies*).

Foot, Philippa. "Rationality and Virtue." *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association,* 57 (2) (1983): 273-283.
Argues that virtue makes action good in a sense that is tied to facts about the human form of life. Explains this sense by drawing attention to the similarity in conceptual structure of evaluations of an individual plant, animal and human as such. Conceives of virtue as sensitivity to reasons and rejects accounts of rationality that float free from conceptions of human goodness. Reprinted in Foot 2002b (cited under *Anthologies*).

Foot, Philippa. "Rationality and Goodness." *Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement* 54 (2004):1-13.
Short paper on practical rationality. There Foot distances her account of virtue from the so-called virtue theory of ethics she finds in the works of Hursthouse, Swanton and Slote.

Foot, Philippa. *Natural Goodness*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.
Elaborates on the sense in which judgments of human goodness extend beyond what philosophers usually take 'moral judgments' to be. Suggests that there must be a way of thinking about happiness which is conceptually linked to virtue, but argues that we must make room in our understanding of happiness for the possibility that happiness might not be available for the best of us.

Hursthouse, Rosalind. *On Virtue Ethics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
Very rich and interesting book. Presents a neo-Aristotelian account of so-called virtue ethics. Following Foot, she fills in the details of a story concerning the sense in which what we commonly recognize as the virtues are forms of natural goodness in human beings.

John Hacker-Wright, "Virtue Ethics without Right Action: Anscombe, Foot, and Contemporary Virtue Ethics." *Journal of Value Inquiry* 44.2 (2010): 209-224.

Contains an excellent explanation of the difference between Anscombe's and Foot's conception of virtue on the one hand and so-called virtue ethics on the other.

Lawrence, Gavin. "The Deep and the Shallow." In *Philippa Foot's Moral Thought*. Edited by John Hacker-Wright. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2018.
Contains a deep and penetrating discussion of the connection of virtue with happiness in Foot's later thought. An important piece of philosophy in its own right.

Against Consequentialism

Foot's discussion of consequentialism, which she takes to be of the first importance in normative ethics, largely takes place in the context of applied ethics. On Foot's diagnosis, the felt difficulty of certain moral dilemmas in applied ethics stems from the appearance that moral action may at least sometimes be what brings about the worst state of affairs. To deal with this difficulty catholic philosophers of her time –most notably of which, Anscombe 1956– defend versions of the doctrine of double effect (which depends on the distinction between intended effects and foreseen but not intended effects). Foot battles with this consequentialist intuition in all her writings on issues in applied ethics and normative ethics. Foot 1983 attempts to directly dispel the attraction of this consequentialist appearance. Schefler 1985 contains an interesting criticism of this attempt. But even in her earlier work (Foot 1967 and 1971) Foot attempts to dismantle this appearance by building on the intuition that different virtues involve rights in different (i.e. positive and negative) ways (see also Foot 1997). Even though she disagrees with Taurek 1977 who thinks that numbers never count in the assessment of moral dilemmas, she suggests that numbers don't matter when different virtues (and so different types of rights) are involved. Given all this Foot 1980 argues against Thompson that the significant issue in discussions of abortion is the question whether the human foetus counts as a being with human rights. Foot 1985 explains how her work in applied ethics is related to a comprehensive critique of consequentialism.

Anscombe, G. E. M. *Mr Truman's Degree*. Oxford: Oxonion, 1956.
Anscombe's protest against the decision of Oxford University to award an honorary degree to the president of the U.S. Harry S. Truman. Argues against consequentialism and defends a version of the doctrine of double effect. Reprinted in *The Collected Philosophical Papers of G. E. M. Anscombe*. Vol. 3, *Ethics, Religion and Politics* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1981).

Bennett, Jonathan. "Whatever the Consequences." *Analysis* 26, 3(1966):83 - 102.
Contains an interesting argument against the doctrine of double effect.

Foot, Philippa. "The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect". *Oxford Review* 5 (1967):5-15.
Argues that the doctrine of double effect does not afford the best explanation of our intuitive opposition to consequentialist readings of cases which require such things as injuring one in order to save five. Suggests that a distinction between injuring (negative rights) and bringing aid (positive rights) helps explain our counter-consequentialist intuitions better. Reprinted in Foot 2002a (cited under *Anthologies*).

Foot, Philippa. "Utilitarianism and the Virtues." *Mind* 94 (1983):196-209.
Rich and interesting argument which formulates claims that are implicit in her earlier work in applied ethics. Argues that consequentialism's attraction trades on the illegitimate moving of considerations of (maximum) welfare from within morality (in

particular from within the perspective of benevolence as one of the virtues) to a criterial position outside it. Relies heavily on Geach's conception of the attributive good. Reprinted in Foot 2002b (cited under *Anthologies*).

Taurek, John M. "Should the Numbers Count?" *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 6.4 (1977):293-316.
> Very smart paper. Argues that consideration of numbers in trade-off cases of harming/benefitting people is not morally significant.

Scheffler, Samuel. "Agent-centered restrictions, Rationality, and the Virtues." Mind 94. 375 (1985): 409-419.
> Insightful, interesting paper. Contains a very clear summary of Foot's critique of consequentialism in Foot 1983 and raises suspicions against her principal claims there. Proposes that the anti-consequentialist task is either to compromise a maximizing conception of rationality with agent-centered restrictions or suggest an alternative, common-sense conception of rationality. Finds Foot's attempt to do the latter weak.

Foot, Philippa. "Euthanasia." *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 6.2 (1997):85-112.
> Distinguishes cases of euthanasia and considers them from the perspective of the virtues of justice (negative rights) and charity (positive rights). Contains a very interesting discussion of the sense in which human life is a good. Explains this in terms of 'the ordinary human life" which includes a minimum of basic goods such as tolerable work, social support, no hunger, hope and rest. Reprinted in Foot 2002a (cited under *Anthologies*).

Thompson, Judith Jarvis. "A Defence of Abortion." *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 1.1 (1971):47-66.
> Argues that abortion can be justified without needing to deny that the foetus has the rights of a human person.

Foot, Philippa. "Killing and Letting Die." *Analysis* 41.3 (1980):159 - 160.
> Rehearses her grounds for considering the distinction between killing and letting die to be morally relevant and argues against Thompson that the difficult discussion in abortion is that concerning the moral status of the foetus. Reprinted in Foot 2002b (cited under *Anthologies*).

Foot, Philippa. "Morality, Action and Outcome." In *Morality and Objectivity: A Tribute to J.L. Mackie*, Ted Honderich (ed). London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985: 23-38.
> Rich and interesting paper. Explains how her work in applied ethics is related to the comprehensive critique of consequentialism, or what she calls outcome morality. Thus, she rehearses some of the arguments from Foot 1967, 1980 and 1983 but argues contra Foot 1967 that the doctrine of double effect is a morally relevant principle that may work sufficiently well against the consequentialist. Reprinted in Foot 2002b (cited under *Anthologies*).

Against Nietzsche
Against the current of the analytic philosophy of her time Foot thinks that moral philosophers ought to face the challenge that Nietzsche's immoralism poses for moral philosophy as such.

Thus, throughout her career she tries to both interpret Nietzsche and argue against his commitment to immoralism.

Foot, Philippa. "Nietzsche: The Revaluation of Values." In *Nietzsche.* Edited by John Richardson & Brian Leiter. Oxford University Press, 2001.
> A surprisingly not very argumentative paper. Suggests that Nietzsche was an immoralist and points out the dependence of his immoralism on a dubiously general view of the springs of human action: the will to power. Reprinted in Foot 2002a (cited under *Anthologies*).

Foot, Philippa. "Nietzsche's Immoralism." *The New York Review of Books* 28, no. 11 (1991): 18-22.
> Longer, more argumentative and interesting paper. Rehearses her interpretation of Nietzsche's thought and argues that even though we should reject his immoralism, we should nevertheless not feel entitled to simply ignore his challenge. Reprinted in Foot 2002b (cited under *Anthologies*).

Foot, Philippa. *Natural Goodness*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.
> Suggests that Nietzsche's immoralism poses a threat for her account of natural goodness and tries to formulate an argument against this threat.

Against Moral Relativism

Continuing her preoccupation with the objectivity of Morality Foot 1982 argues against Williams' (Williams 2010) defense of a variant of moral relativism. Harman 2010 also argues for moral relativism in the same year (1975) as Williams. The exchange between Harman and Thomson (Harman and Thompson 1996) is a good place to look at for a better understanding of the debate on moral relativism.

Foot, Philippa. "Moral Relativism." In *Relativism: Cognitive and Moral.* Edited by Michael Krausz and Jack Meiland, 152–166. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1982.

> Argues against Williams's distinction between real and notional confrontations. Reprinted in Foot 2002b (cited under *Anthologies*).

Williams, Bernard. "The Truth in Relativism." In *Relativism: A Contemporary Anthology*. Edited by Michael Krausz, 242–253. New York: Columbia University Press, 2010.

> Distinguishes between real and notional confrontations with alien systems and argues for moral relativism. Originally published in 1975.

Harman, Gilbert. "Moral Relativism Defended." In *Relativism: A Contemporary Anthology*. Edited by Michael Krausz, 225–241. New York: Columbia University Press, 2010.

> Argues for moral relativism on the basis of the account of the moral ought as a four-place operator that relates an agent, an act, relevant considerations, and motivating attitudes. Originally published in 1975.

Harman, Gilbert, and Judith Jarvis Thomson. *Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity*. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1996.

A very interesting debate set up between an opponent (Thompson) and a proponent (Harman) of moral relativism.